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Abstract
Jonathan Wolff, amongst others, has criticised luck egalitarian theories of 
distributive justice because these theories require untalented citizens to re-
veal their lack of talent to the state. He believes that, even in an ideal egalitar-
ian society, this would cause citizens to feel ashamed. Having to reveal facts 
that one considers shameful undermines one’s self-respect. The state should 
treat its citizens with respect and, thus, it ought not to treat them in ways 
that undermine their self-respect. In this paper, I argue that this shameful 
revelations allegation is false. In an ideal egalitarian society, people would 
believe that a person’s natural marketable talents are an inappropriate basis 
on which to measure her value. Emotions typically have a cognitive struc-
ture: one of the constitutive components of each particular emotion is a 
particular type of belief. Shame is felt when one believes that one does not 
possess some quality that one believes one needs to have in order to have 
value. So, since citizens of an ideal egalitarian society will not believe that 
a person’s value depends on her natural marketable talents, they will not 
feel ashamed of being untalented. This is good news. Luck egalitarian theo-
ries require citizens to reveal their untalentedness because it is necessary 
in order to achieve fairness in the distribution of resources and/or welfare. 
Wolff’s allegation therefore implies that fairness and respect will conflict in 
an ideal egalitarian society. But, if I am correct, we may be able to achieve 
both these values.
Keywords: Ideal luck egalitarianism, democratic egalitarianism, shameful 
revelation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
All egalitarians ought to take both fairness and respect seriously. Egalitarian 
theories of distributive justice should, therefore, be sensitive to both these 
values. In ‘Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos’ Jonathan Wolff argues 
that even in an ideal egalitarian society, that is, a society where the inhabit-
ants embrace and are guided by the underlying principles that inform the 
way that society is governed, these two values are very likely to conflict (Wolff 
1998). Many prominent recent theories of distributive justice have been fo-
cused solely on fairness, and his argument is intended as a criticism of them: 
if, even at the ideal level, we must sacrifice respect to achieve full fairness, we 
shouldn’t seek full fairness and we should spend less time theorising about 
it. Wolff’s claim that fairness and respect are very likely to conflict has con-
siderable prima facie plausibility and is well known. Further it has received 
explicit endorsement by some political theorists (e. g. Hinton 2001: 73; Lang 
2009: 329)1 and is implicit in “What is the Point of Equality?”, Elizabeth An-
derson’s famous polemic against fairness-focused theories (Anderson 1999).2 
Wolff’s claim, however, is incorrect and in this paper I shall demonstrate why. 
But, before I do so, it is necessary to briefly rehearse Wolff’s argument. 
The prominent fairness-orientated theories Wolff has in mind are those 
that have come to be known as ‘luck egalitarian’ theories.3 Wolff accepts 
the basic insight of luck egalitarianism (and its conception of fairness): if a 
person is responsible for having a less than equal share of resources and/or 
welfare, then this inequality is not unfair (Wolff 1998: 97). To illustrate the in-
sight, consider Will Kymlicka’s well-known depiction of it: the tennis player 
and the gardener.4 Two single people of equal natural ability are each given a 
plot of land with equal potential. One person, the gardener, works hard and 
cultivates her land. The other person, the tennis player, idles around all day 
playing tennis. As a result, the gardener becomes rich and the tennis player 
becomes poor (Kymlicka 2002: 72-3). The luck egalitarian view is that if we 
required the gardener to transfer some of her wealth to the tennis player, it 
would be unfair because the tennis player is responsible for his poverty and 
1. Richard Arneson criticises Wolff’s overall argument, but, unlike mine, his defence of luck 
egalitarianism does not reject the idea that revealing untalentedness must be shameful (see 
later in the introduction, Arneson 2000). 
2. Anderson does not explicitly refer to Wolff’s argument but she does believe that fair-
ness and respect conflict. She asks her readers to imagine untalented citizens receiving letters 
with their state-benefit cheques. These letters explain to the untalented citizens that they are to 
receive extra state-benefits because their talents are unmarketable. Then she writes ‘Can a self-
respecting citizen fail to be insulted by such messages?’ (Anderson 1999: 305, my emphasis). 
3. Wolff refers to them as ‘opportunity conceptions of equality’ (Wolff 1998). I depart from 
his phrasing in order to follow common usage. 
4. The insight is not Kymlicka’s. It is Ronald Dworkin’s (2000). 
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the gardener for her wealth.5 Conversely, luck egalitarians hold that inequal-
ities in resources and/or welfare that people are not responsible for, that is, 
inequalities that arise out of brute luck, are unfair. So, for example, if I were 
born without legs and, in my society, being legless gives one the additional 
disadvantage of it being more difficult to acquire further resources and/or 
welfare, this would be unfair. Additionally, luck egalitarianism would, other 
things equal, require that I be compensated by the state to mitigate for my 
disadvantage. 
In order to achieve a fair distribution, a luck egalitarian state would, 
therefore, need to collect information about how far each citizen is respon-
sible for having the level of resources or welfare that they do. One piece of 
information that would be needed to find this out is the level of marketable 
natural talents (“talents” for short) that each individual has.6 This kind of 
data collection raises issues relating to privacy. However, even leaving these 
aside, Wolff argues that this type of data collection makes luck egalitarianism 
problematic because it undermines respect. He says: 
Consider... the case of someone who is unemployed at a time of low un-
employment and no particular shortage of jobs. To qualify for [state] ben-
efits this person will have to show that he or she does not have the oppor-
tunities that others have. But, by hypothesis, ...the failure, if there is one, 
is... the lack of talent or aptitude for the jobs that are available. To press a 
claim, then, one is required not merely to admit but to make out a con-
vincing case that one is a failure, unable to gain employment even when 
there is no difficulty for others. But think how it must feel —how demean-
ing it must be— to have to admit to oneself and then convince others 
that one has not been able to secure a job, despite one’s best efforts, at a 
time when others appear to obtain employment with ease (Wolff 1998: 
114-115).
Wolff alleges that even in an ideal egalitarian society, having to reveal to 
oneself and the state that one is untalented would cause citizens to feel 
ashamed. Following Wolff, I shall call this the ‘shameful revelations’ allegation 
(Wolff 1998: 109). Causing citizens to feel ashamed in the process of granting 
them their distributive entitlements is not compatible with treating citizens 
with respect. So, if the shameful revelations allegation were true, then, there 
would indeed be a conflict between fairness and respect. In response to this 
5. Of course, if the tennis player were starving the gardener should give him some food. But 
it would, nonetheless, be unfair on the gardener to have to do this. 
6. Let’s assume that people are not responsible, in the relevant sense, for their natural tal-
ents. And, since the talents are defined in a market based way, being untalented poses a signifi-
cant barrier to acquiring resources or welfare.
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conflict, Wolff proposes that even at an ideal level, we have reason to prefer a 
system of unconditional state benefits over a luck egalitarian system. 
Wolff makes several other (related) arguments in the paper. For example, 
he discusses two different ways in which having to reveal one’s untalent-
edness might undermine one’s self-respect in a non-ideal luck egalitarian 
society,7 notes some problems with using two person examples and points 
to the dangers of solely doing ideal theory. However, I put these to one side 
and focus on the following version of the shameful revelations allegation: 
even in an ideal egalitarian society, having to reveal to the state that one is 
untalented would cause citizens to feel ashamed.
A luck egalitarian could respond to the shameful revelations allegation 
by simply accommodating its claim. She might say, without much ado, that, 
of course, luck egalitarianism should be limited in its application by other 
values (like respect) and no one ever thought otherwise (Lippert-Rasmussen 
2009).8 There are two versions of this view: that luck egalitarian fairness and 
respect should be traded off against each other or that luck egalitarianism is 
conditionally sound, i.e. sound only if it is consistent with respect. Alterna-
tively a luck egalitarian might claim that the shameful revelations allegation 
provides welfare-based luck egalitarian reasons against the achievement of 
complete fairness in the distribution of resources. That is, if luck egalitari-
anism aims to equalise access to welfare, and collecting information about 
citizens’ talents will make them ashamed, then luck egalitarianism would 
not require this information to be collected (see e. g. Arneson 2000: 177). 
However, neither of these responses really challenge Wolff’s argument, since 
both responses accept his main contention —that there is a conflict between 
fairness and respect in a luck egalitarian society. The first type of response 
clearly grants this main point. That the second does so is less obvious but, 
in fact, it concedes the problem and pushes it back a level. If one claims that 
welfare-based luck egalitarian reasons would prohibit making people reveal 
their lack of talents, then there is still a conflict between fairness and respect 
- it’s just that it’s been rebranded, in Wolff’s terms, as “fairness conflicted 
against itself” and, it seems, respect has won (Wolff 1998: 117-118).9
My argument does not take this concessive tack. I aim to refute the 
shameful revelations allegation itself and therefore show that the conflict 
Wolff points to is not real. My basic argument is as follows: emotions have a 
7. These are: (i) that to be asked to constantly justify one’s claims (including one’s claim to 
state benefits) could be insulting and demeaning because one might feel as though one is not 
trusted. And (ii) our experience of conditional state benefit schemes tells us that benefit recipi-
ents are often ‘treated with great rudeness’ (See Wolff 1998: 108-9, 111 and 110 respectively). 
8. G. A. Cohen and Zofia Stemplowska each give this kind of pluralist response to different 
challenges to luck-egalitarianism (Cohen 2008: 4; Stemplowska 2008: 243).
9. I thank an anonymous referee for help with framing this paragraph.
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cognitive structure, that is, one of the constitutive components of each par-
ticular emotion is a particular type of belief. For example, one of the com-
ponents of fear is the belief that danger is approaching or present. Shame 
is felt when one believes that one does not possess some quality that one 
believes one needs to have in order to have value (in some deep, but not 
necessarily moral, sense of the word ‘value’). So, in order to be ashamed of 
being untalented, one must believe that one’s value depends on the natu-
ral marketable talents one possesses. As I said, Wolff intends the shame-
ful revelations allegation to apply to an ideal egalitarian society, where an 
ideal egalitarian society is defined as one where the inhabitants embrace 
and are guided by the underlying principles that inform the way that that 
society is governed.10 But believing that a person’s value, in any deep sense, 
depends on her marketable natural talents is highly inegalitarian (although 
admittedly in a different sense of the word to how it is used in the phrase 
‘luck-egalitarian’). So it is my contention that in an ideal egalitarian society, 
people will not believe this and, therefore, will not be ashamed of being un-
talented. The shameful revelations allegation is false and we can, therefore, 
show that the conflict between fairness and respect is not real. In an ideal 
egalitarian society, the threat of people having to make shameful revela-
tions will not provide a reason for us to have an unconditional state-benefit 
system. 
My paper will be structured as follows. Section I will outline what beliefs 
the citizens of a society must hold in order for the society be an ideal egali-
tarian one. Section II will explain the cognitive structure of emotions and 
give a brief conceptual analysis of shame. Section III will provide a summary 
of my argument and give its conclusion. I will consider and reject possible 
objections to my argument in section IV. (Namely worries arising from (i) the 
fact that some people in current society would say that marketable talents 
don’t add to a person’s value but would feel ashamed if they found out they 
were untalented and (ii) the fact that careers are important goods for many 
people). My paper only seeks to defend ideal luck egalitarianism from Wolff’s 
10. I should note that it is a little ambiguous whether by ‘an ideal egalitarian society’ Wolff 
means one where the inhabitants embrace the underlying principles. But he does say:
[A]n ethos is a set of underlying values, which... may be explicit or implicit, interpreted as 
a set of maxims, slogans, or principles, which are then applied in practice. As an idealiza-
tion we can identify three levels: values, principles, and practice, all of which are part of the 
group’s ethos. Typically the values and principles will be internalized by members of that 
group, and inform their behaviour’ (Wolff 1998: 105 my emphasis).
And, in any case, if this is not what he means by ‘ideal egalitarian society’, then his argu-
ment lacks bite. If someone were to say ‘in a society where people do not embrace egalitarian 
principles, people may well be ashamed at their lack of talents’, this would not be a damning 
criticism of luck egalitarian theories which are, for the most part, pitched at the ideal level as 
I’ve defined it. 
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attack (I would like to be clear about this). However, whether a theory is suc-
cessful or not at the ideal level affects its application and, in section V, I will 
conclude by briefly and tentatively considering the real-world policy impli-
cations of my argument.
Let me emphasise that in this paper I am discussing brute or natural 
talents, like physical abilities or raw intelligence rather than character-trait 
based talents like drive, ambition, or being hardworking. I limit my discus-
sion in this way for three reasons. First, I am a compatibilist in the context 
of the free-will debate: crudely speaking, even though people do not choose 
their character traits, there is a sense in which they endorse them11 and I 
think this is a sufficient basis on which to hold them responsible for them.12 
Second, even if one thinks people are not responsible for their character-trait 
talents in the relevant sense and that in an ideal luck egalitarian society it is 
inevitable that people will be ashamed of, for example, being lazy or unam-
bitious this would significantly reduce the force of the shameful revelations 
allegation. The idea that lazy and unambitious people would be ashamed 
of claiming state benefits is nowhere near as alarming as the idea that those 
with, for example, a learning disability would be. Third, this is the meaning 
Wolff has in mind.13
Before getting into the meat of my argument, it is worth mentioning that 
Wolff has recently published ‘Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos 
Revisited’ (Wolff 2010).. In this paper, Wolff explores some ways in which a 
person might be tested for untalentedness without shaming them or under-
mining their self-respect (e. g. by sensitive interviews combined with coun-
selling). His main conclusion in the new paper is that: 
11. Consider, for example, the character traits of enjoying cookery, being hard working or 
even being lazy: there is a sense in which we feel accountable for these traits (perhaps they 
express some of our values). Contrast this with brute facts about ourselves, such as being tall 
or having red hair: even if these features form part of our identity we don’t feel accountable for 
them. 
12. There is a more nuanced sort of compatibilist view one can take whereby one thinks 
that say, it is appropriate to hold a person responsible for character traits in some sense (for 
example it is appropriate to blame him) but it is not appropriate to hold him responsible in 
the sense that one should refuse to compensate him for it. However, if one does hold this view 
and one thinks that it is likely that people will be ashamed of laziness even in an ideal luck 
egalitarian society, this is not that problematic (see main text), especially when viewed from the 
perspective of someone who already accepts that we can attach some kind of responsibility to 
unchosen character-traits.
13.  We can see this because he distinguishes talents from hard work here:
You may respect [a person] for their hard-work, or for their talents, or their devotion to their 
ageing parents... (Wolff 1998: 109).
And here:
We are asked to imagine two people, equally talented, one of whom works hard gardening... 
(Wolff 1998: 99).
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[T]hings are very likely to go badly wrong if we set out an ideal theory 
of equality and then attempt to implement it in the real world without 
a great deal of further thought about how it would actually impact on 
people, and the relations between them (Wolff 2010: 349).
I do not disagree with this conclusion but it is obvious and, as Wolff him-
self says, ‘bland’ (Wolff 2010: 349). Further, the main idea of my paper (that 
in an ideal luck egalitarian society people would not be ashamed of being 
untalented) is not discussed in his new paper and the shameful revelations 
allegation is influential, important and interesting in its own right. For these 
reasons, unless otherwise stated, I will direct my arguments against the orig-
inal paper. 
2. EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND THE IDEAL EGALITARIAN SOCIETY
There are different kinds of value that a person can have. One is the type of 
value that persons have just in virtue of being persons. Another type of value 
is moral value, by which I mean, how morally praiseworthy a person is. I 
think both these types of value contribute to a person’s value and, impor-
tantly for our purposes, they contribute to her value in a deep and important 
sense. (I will refer to the kind of value a person has in a deep and important 
sense, as a person’s deep value and shall elaborate a bit as to what I mean by 
the phrase in section II (ii)). An important question in this paper is whether 
an egalitarian of any stripe should accept the claim that a person’s value in 
any deep or important sense depends on her level of marketable natural tal-
ents. I claim she should not. She may accept that it is valuable for a person 
to be talented, that a person is more valuable in some trivial sense if she has 
more marketable natural talents. But accepting any more than this would 
entail that an able-bodied person is correct to say to a legless person, ‘Look 
here legless person, I am more valuable than you, in a deep and important 
sense, because I can walk and you cannot’. But such a claim seems morally 
objectionable and unacceptably inegalitarian.14 So, I think that no egalitar-
ian —indeed nobody— should accept that a person’s deep value hinges on 
her marketable natural talents. Moreover, I think that most, if not all, egali-
tarians do not accept this. So I propose:
14. Elizabeth Anderson writes: 
[Luck egalitarianism] makes the basis for citizens’ claims on one another the fact that some 
are inferior to others in the worth of their lives, talents, and personal qualities Thus, its 
principles express contemptuous pity for those the state stamps as sadly inferior’ (Ander-
son 1999: 298). 
Has she forgotten that the value of a person and the marketable value of a person’s talents 
are not the same thing and that it is objectionable and inegalitarian to think otherwise?
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The irrelevance of talents principle (ITP): A person’s deep value does not 
depend on her level of marketable natural talents. 
Accepting the ITP is not entailed by belief in the luck egalitarian principle 
(LEP). (The LEP is that it is unfair if people are disadvantaged in terms of 
welfare and/or resources because of things that they are not responsible for, 
not that people’s deep value is unaffected by their talents). But there is noth-
ing to stop a person from believing in both the ITP and the LEP. And I suspect 
that many (but not all) luck egalitarians are motivated to accept the LEP pre-
cisely because of something like the following thought process: differences 
in natural marketable talents are (i) arbitrary from a moral point of view, and 
therefore (ii) do not affect a person’s deep value and thus (iii) ought not to 
be a barrier to her accessing welfare and/or resources. There is some con-
troversy to the issue. For example, those who accept moral luck may try to 
argue that deep value tracks certain skills (e. g. they could try to argue that 
a surgeon with twelve well functioning fingers is of more value). However, it 
is always open to a luck egalitarian to adopt the ITP as a principle which she 
thinks should inform the ethos of an egalitarian society, even if it is not this 
principle that motivated her to become a luck egalitarian.15 Moreover, reject-
ing the ITP is somewhat unpalatable. I lack the space to engage in a fuller 
defence of the ITP here, so I will simply take the more intuitive view, which I 
happen to endorse, as my springboard.16.
Following John Rawls, I assume, uncontroversially, that in order for a so-
ciety to be an ideal egalitarian society, its inhabitants must embrace and be 
guided by egalitarian principles (Rawls 1999: 397). I include the ITP as an 
egalitarian principle (although it is a different type of egalitarian principle to 
the LEP). So I propose:
1.  In an ideal egalitarian society, citizens will firmly embrace the ITP. 
That is, they will not believe a person’s deep value depends on her 
level of marketable natural talents.
Wolff intends the shameful revelations allegation to apply at the ideal level. 
He says: ‘revealing that one is of low talent will be considered shameful, even 
in an ideal egalitarian society’(Wolff 1998: 115 my emphasis). That is, he be-
lieves that people who embraced egalitarian principles would be ashamed 
of being untalented. But I find this puzzling. Why would people be ashamed 
15. Wolff’s argument leaves the impression that the conflict between fairness and respect 
is nigh on inevitable (though he shies back from such strong language). Thus even if a luck 
egalitarian adopts the ITP as an additional, rather than internal, principle she can still challenge 
this assumption.
16. I thank Zofia Stemplowska for some of the material in this paragraph. 
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of being untalented if they really believed that their talents don’t contribute 
to their value in any deep sense? 
In the rest of the paper I will argue that I am correct to be puzzled. If 
people believed in the ITP firmly enough, they wouldn’t be ashamed of being 
untalented. In order to explain why not, I must say something about both 
the conceptual structure of emotions generally, and what shame is.
3. EMOTIONS AND SHAME
3.1. The Structure Of Emotions17
There is a high level of agreement amongst philosophers of emotion that in 
order for some feeling to be, conceptually speaking, an emotion it must con-
tain a cognitive component, that is, it must contain a belief,18 and this belief 
must be appropriately connected to the emotion in question.19 Let me say a 
few words to help explain this definition. Our emotions are not just empty 
electrical impulses. For example, if someone ‘has just raped my child, my an-
ger...is not just a mindless impulse. It involves a thought about the terrible 
damage my child has just suffered, and the wrongfulness of the offenders act’ 
(Nussbaum 2004: 10). To illustrate how central the cognitive component is to 
the concept of emotion, imagine a woman who has a racing heart, is trem-
bling, has light nausea, is red, narrows her eyes, bares her teeth and bangs her 
fist on the table. This description could be a description of an angry woman 
but, though less common, it could be someone having a seizure. Unless we 
make reference to a cognitive element, namely the belief that she or someone 
else has been wronged, we cannot be sure that the thing under discussion is 
anger. You can’t capture all that there is to an emotion without referring to its 
component belief. This reveals that emotions contain beliefs.20
2.  Emotions contain a cognitive component. That is, emotions include 
an appropriate belief.21
I am not going to offer a detailed defence of 2: I shall just rely on the author-
ity of the existing literature. I will, however, discuss one further issue relating 
17. I thank Rebecca Reilly-Cooper for guidance in navigating the philosophical literature 
on the structure of emotion. 
18. There is debate concerning whether the cognitive element must be a belief as opposed 
to some other cognitive state (like a judgment, ‘seeing-as’, ‘alief’, or an ‘imagining’). But, for my 
purposes, it is unnecessary to get into these more fine-grained distinctions: I use the word ‘be-
lief’ in a broad sense: simply to indicate a cognitive element.
19. See Greenspan 1988; Lyons 1980; Nussbaum 2004; de Sousa 1987.
20. In this paragraph I have borrowed examples and phrasing from Nussbaum (2004: 27). 
21. There are other features that a feeling must have to be an emotion (e. g. they must be 
directed towards some object or state of affairs) but these aren’t relevant to my paper.
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to 2 because it will be useful for a point I wish to make later. Sometimes we 
have emotions that contain beliefs we profess not to have (Nussbaum 2004: 
11-12). Consider the following example: Mary adamantly declares that she 
believes her partner is not cheating on her, but she is, nonetheless, seized 
by fits of jealousy when he doesn’t come home from work on time. I think 
examples like these do have a cognitive explanation. I think that what’s go-
ing on in this example is that either Mary pretends (to herself and/or others) 
that she doesn’t believe her boyfriend is cheating on her —given the trauma 
of a break-up, she has a strong incentive to keep up this pretence. Or per-
haps she keeps changing her mind as to what she believes. This shows us 
that people can have emotions that contain beliefs that they’re not that sure 
of, or that aren’t consistent with their other beliefs. But, the important point 
is that Mary’s jealousy gives us reason to doubt her claim that she believes 
her boyfriend is faithful. It does not give us reason to think that emotions 
don’t contain cognitive elements. (One might be able to think of emotions, 
or feelings, which lack, or seem to lack, a belief. Perhaps the fear associated 
with phobias is one such example. However, this is not the way we typi-
cally experience emotions and, thus, need not preoccupy us too much for 
the purpose of this paper. In any case, I use the word belief broadly (c.f. 
note xviii)). 
3.2. Shame
I shall now outline what one needs to believe to be ashamed. When you feel 
shame, you are evaluating your personal qualities rather than simply an act 
you’ve performed. So, for example, if you were to spit on someone’s face, 
if you are ashamed of this, you do not just think ‘what I did was rude’ but 
rather ‘I am a rude person for doing that’. Moreover, shame is felt when you 
believe that you do not possess a personal quality that is important to you. 
But, the fact that some personal quality is important to you is not enough to 
mean that you will be ashamed of not having it. It has to be important to you 
in a specific kind of way. Simply failing to possess a quality that is important 
to you would normally occasion regret. But it need not occasion shame. For 
example, you can deeply desire to be able to sing beautifully without feeling 
ashamed of being a terrible singer. I think this is explained by the thought 
that shame is felt when one perceives oneself to lack a personal quality that 
one believes one ought to have. The sort of ‘ought’ I have in mind can be, but 
is wider than, the moral sort of ought. That is, it’s wider than the sort of fail-
ure that renders one a morally blameworthy or bad person. But the ‘ought’ in 
question must be one that is bound up with something the ashamed person 
takes to be a serious norm about how she should be (Nussbaum 2004: 204). 
That is, she must think that the norm has a similar normative force to moral 
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that is connected to one’s serious norms, then, in my terms, one thinks that 
failing to possess this quality would detract from one’s deep value.
I thus propose that
3.  In order to feel shame one must believe that one lacks a quality that 
one believes contributes to one’s deep value.22 
Therefore, 
4.  In order to be ashamed of being untalented, one must believe that 
marketable natural talents contribute to one’s deep value.
It might be helpful to relate deep value and shame to Stephen Darwall’s dis-
tinction between recognition self-respect and appraisal self-respect (Darwall 
1977: 47-19). Recognition self-respect is the sort of respect one should have 
for oneself solely in virtue of being a person, “a being with a will who acts for 
reasons” (for example, recognising that one is the sort of being that possess 
moral rights and duties). Appraisal self-respect, according to Darwall, is felt 
when one believes one lives up to the standards that it is appropriate for a 
person to live up to (so, for example, one can lose appraisal self-respect if one 
believes one is not living up to one’s moral duties). He classifies self-esteem 
as being felt when one possesses a quality that is desired but not connected 
to the properties that should give rise to recognition respect. It is tempting 
to say therefore that, according to my classification, one feels ashamed when 
one lacks appraisal-self respect (and possibly also recognition self-respect 
but I’ll put this to one side). However, using Darwall’s definitions, this is a 
little too narrow: it is plausible to think (at least in contemporary society) 
that one does not need to be hard-working to be a person and that one does 
not have a moral duty to be hardworking and yet feel ashamed of being lazy. 
However, for this to be the case they must take hard-workingness to be a vir-
tue of some kind, that is to have some serious normative weight rather than 
simply being a quality they would like to possess. This is why I argue that 
shame is tied to one’s perceived deep value rather than one’s personhood.23 
Someone might think I’m mistaken in saying that shame is bound up 
with serious norms, that is, with what gives a person value in a deep way. In 
ordinary language, people sometimes use the word ‘shame’ in connection 
with fairly trivial norms. But the type of shame Wolff has in mind must be 
shame that’s connected to serious norms. If not, then the shame involved in 
22. Shame contains other types of belief, but these are not important for my paper.
23. Accepting the ITP is consistent with a person taking, for example, “being a good musi-
cian” as forming part of her deep value. It is inconsistent with her believing that the natural 
talents which help her to be a good musician form part of this deep value.
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the shameful revelations allegation would not be very painful and thus lose 
its bite.
Of course, if forcing ideal luck egalitarian citizens to reveal that their lack 
of talent will embarrass them severely, this is not good news for luck egal-
itarians. I do not view embarrassment as a (necessarily) lighter version of 
shame but, rather, as a similar but ultimately different emotion. It can be 
felt at a range of different intensities. But should luck egalitarians fear an 
embarrassing revelations allegation? Probably not: embarrassment is typi-
cally connected to the thought that you have publically done something that 
is out of place, socially speaking: we feel embarrassed when we publically 
contravene social norms. By a social norm here, I don’t just mean something 
that is frequently done by members of the society. I mean something that is 
viewed as perfectly acceptable behaviour by members of the society (and, 
thus, some behaviours which are fairly unusual are not embarrassing). As 
such, the things we feel embarrassed about are highly dependent on contex-
tual social norms. For example, many British people would be embarrassed 
(and painfully so) if someone walked in on them going to the toilet. But, in 
Delhi, people habitually defecate on the street and it is hard to imagine that 
they are embarrassed by so-doing. In an ideal luck egalitarian society, reveal-
ing one’s lack of talents will not be socially out of place. It will be the norm: 
only untalented people will do it, but it will not be something that’s viewed 
as unacceptable, inferior or weird: it will be viewed as people claiming what 
they’re entitled to. Further, though belief in the ITP relates to serious norms 
and thus shame, rather than embarrassment, one’s beliefs about serious 
norms will surely have some effect on what one gets embarrassed about.24 
Thus it seems unlikely that embarrassment at lack of talents would persist in 
an ideal luck egalitarian society.
 Further, there is no reason why a luck egalitarian state would need to 
force citizens to broadcast their untalentedness to the rest of the nation: one 
state official would do. And we all know that certain actions are much less 
embarrassing when performed in front of a contextually appropriate indi-
vidual (think of a trip to the gynaecologist). My point here is not that genuine 
or deep embarrassment can’t be felt in front of one person or that it does not 
matter if it is only felt in front of one person. It is, rather, that when there is 
a contextually appropriate individual (or perhaps group), the experience is 
(for most people) much less embarrassing or not even embarrassing at all 
(and therefore much less painful or not painful at all). This is because of the 
fact that embarrassment is highly dependent on contextual social norms. 
Minimal embarrassment does not pervasively corrode one’s self-respect 
24. The ITP is not merely an ‘officially recognised’ norm: it is one that is embraced by citi-
zens (or else the society is not ideal). 
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—which is the issue at hand in this paper— and is, in my view, a price worth 
paying for fairness.25
I am not claiming that embarrassment at lack of talents would, without 
a shadow of a doubt, be completely eliminated from an ideal luck egalitar-
ians society. However, it is clear that pervasive embarrassment at lack of tal-
ents should not be considered a certainty or even particularly likely in such 
a society. The vague possibility that people will be embarrassed at revealing 
their lack of talents in an ideal luck egalitarian society is not sufficient reason 
to dismiss luck egalitarianism. Therefore, luck egalitarians need not fear an 
embarrassing revelations allegation. 
4. SUMMARY
My argument against the shameful revelations allegation thus takes the fol-
lowing form:
1.  In an ideal egalitarian society, citizens will firmly embrace the ITP. 
That is, they will not believe a person’s deep value depends on her 
level of marketable natural talents.
2.  Emotions contain a cognitive component. That is, emotions contain 
an appropriate belief.
3.  In order to feel shame one must believe that one lacks a quality that 
one believes contributes to one’s deep value. Therefore:
4.  In order to be ashamed of being untalented, one must believe that 
marketable natural talents contribute to one’s deep value.
So my conclusion is
5.  Since ideal egalitarian citizens will not believe that marketable natural 
talents contribute to a person’s deep value, they will not be ashamed 
of being untalented. 
25. Perhaps this kind of response could be deployed against the shameful, as opposed to 
embarrassing, revelations allegation, but I’m sceptical about the possibility. Since shame is de-
pendent on your beliefs about personal value rather than your beliefs about social norms, you 
could experience equal shame at revealing something you thought was shameful in front of 
a ‘contextually appropriate’ person as you could by revealing it in public (though, of course, 
the latter would undoubtedly be more unpleasant for other reasons, for example, you would 
probably experience humiliation). (Support for this idea can be found in the claim commonly 
made in the literature that embarrassment and humiliation require an observer (or at least an 
imagined observer) whereas shame does not. It would be entirely normal to be ashamed about 
lying to your relative without even thinking about the view of a third party. But it would be 
utterly bizarre to, say, feel embarrassed about going to the loo without an (at least imaginary) 
observer). 
44 Joanna Firth
LEAP, 1 (2013)
So revealing that one is untalented would not be shameful in an ideal egali-
tarian society. Therefore being required to reveal this information to the 
state in order to claim one’s benefits would not undermine ideal egalitarian 
citizens’ self-respect. So the shameful revelations allegation does not mean 
that unconditional state welfare benefits would be needed in an ideal egali-
tarian society. This is good news: we may be able to achieve both respect and 
fairness in an ideal egalitarian society. 
5. OBJECTIONS
5.1. Us and Them
One might reasonably wonder whether it’s true that most people in our 
current society think that a person’s deep value depends on her talents. If 
they do not, then, since it’s nevertheless true that many people in our cur-
rent society would be ashamed of admitting that they’re too untalented to 
get a job, this poses a problem for my argument: why would ideal egalitar-
ian citizens be any different? If we asked citizens of our current society out-
right, ‘Do you think a person’s value, in a deep sense, is determined by her 
talents?’ chances are that at least some of them would say ‘no’. However, I 
think there are grounds for thinking that many citizens of our current so-
ciety do not believe in the ITP, or at least not in a very full sense. As David 
Miller warns, ‘when focusing on expressed beliefs, we risk picking up what 
might be called “Sunday-best” beliefs, that is, the views that people think 
they ought to hold according to some imbibed theory, as opposed to the 
operational beliefs that would guide them in a practical situation’ (Miller 
1999: 61-62). I believe that there are strong indications that many current 
citizens do not fully endorse the ITP. Given the topic of the paper (and the 
fact that emotions contain a cognitive component), the most obvious thing 
to say is that the fact that current citizens are ashamed of being untalented 
shows that they do not fully embrace the ITP. Compare the case of Mary: 
her jealousy makes us think she doesn’t fully believe that her partner is 
not unfaithful. There are other behaviours that indicate that we don’t cur-
rently deeply embrace the ITP. For example, we commonly praise children 
by saying things like ‘what a clever girl!’, some people will look down their 
nose at you if don’t know, say, who composed Eine Kleine Nachtmusik26 
and some people think that being a talented footballer or musician makes 
you ‘cool’. 
26. The fact that knowing who composed Eine Kleine Nachtmusik doesn’t actually show 
that you’re intelligent doesn’t matter. Some people (intellectual snobs) seem to think it does 
show this. 
	 What’s So Shameful about Shameful Revelations? 4�
LEAP, 1 (2013)
So, given the presence of shame at lack of talents and these other behav-
iours in current society, it is false to say that (many) current citizens fully 
embrace the ITP despite saying that they do. I’m not sure exactly how fully 
citizens must embrace the ITP in order for us to be able to truthfully call the 
society an ideal egalitarian one. But I do not think that the level to which 
current citizens do is sufficient. So from the fact that current citizens feel 
ashamed at lacking talents, it doesn’t follow that ideal luck egalitarian citi-
zens would. Since we do not live in an ideal egalitarian society, this is unsur-
prising.
Nonetheless, one might think that the fact that people in our current so-
ciety don’t firmly endorse the ITP fails to solve the problem. What if there is 
a reason why current citizens don’t fully endorse the ITP that would remain 
even in an egalitarian society? Stated clearly this objection simply amounts 
to the charge that an ideal luck egalitarian society would be very difficult 
to achieve. (Let’s call this the difficulty objection). But this objection is irrel-
evant: it has nothing to do with the question of whether people would feel 
ashamed of being untalented if an ideal egalitarian society were achieved. 
And, in any case, the fact that an ideal luck egalitarian society would be dif-
ficult to achieve is not really damaging to luck egalitarian theories because 
it’s not as though their proponents don’t know this. (Of course, one could 
read the objection as being that ideal theory is not worth doing because it 
is impracticable or non-action guiding but this is a broader methodological 
objection to ideal theory more generally, and thus is beyond the scope of this 
paper).
However, I will address a variant of the difficulty objection which states 
that an ideal society would be difficult to maintain because it would not be 
any easier for citizens of an egalitarian society to believe firmly in the ITP 
than it is for citizens of our current society. 
I believe there is reason to doubt this idea: although people in our current 
society might express a belief in the ITP, it could hardly be called a dominant 
ideal. That is, it does not, in any major way, guide our (institutional and other) 
practices, nor is it frequently mentioned in public discourse. However, this 
wouldn’t be the case in an ideal egalitarian society. It would be a dominant 
ideal: our institutional, and other, practices would be guided by it. It seems 
likely, therefore, that the topic would come up more in public discourse. It 
seems to me that if a particular ideal guides your society’s institutional, and 
other, practices and informs its public discourse, it will be much more likely 
that this ideal will gain greater prominence in one’s own conscious and un-
conscious beliefs. In other words, the features and background culture of an 
ideal egalitarian society should make it easier for its citizens to embrace the 
ITP more fully. I don’t think this is controversial: the background features of 
a person’s society obviously influence her beliefs. 
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It is also worth making explicit that the level of commitment to the ITP 
that I demand is not as high as it might first appear, making it more feasible. 
First, I have only been asking ‘would ideal luck egalitarians endorse the ITP 
in a full sense?’. I have not been asking ‘will all traces of any beliefs that con-
tradict the ITP be removed from the mind of ideal egalitarian citizens?’. This 
makes the depth of the endorsement of the ITP required by ideal egalitarian 
citizens more feasible.27 Second, in order for the shameful revelations alle-
gation to be put to rest it is not necessary that we must be able to achieve a 
society where there is no possibility that even one single person might not 
firmly embrace the ITP. It is only necessary that the general ethos of the so-
ciety makes the great majority of untalented people embrace the ITP. Even 
if the shame of the few that do not is serious, expecting theories of justice to 
cater to peoples’ peccadilloes is setting too high a standard. 
5.2. The Importance of Careers
Timothy Hinton writes, 
It might be objected that Wolff’s worry is too insignificant to be of concern 
to egalitarians. “After all”, someone might say, “in an egalitarian society, 
people would have quite different attitudes towards talents from those 
held by people in our societies. They would view the distribution of tal-
ent as being arbitrary from a moral point of view. And hence, untalented 
people would have no more reason to feel ashamed at having to admit 
their lack of talent than anyone here and now has to feel ashamed at be-
ing brown-eyed or dark-haired”. I do not find this reply persuasive be-
cause looks of this kind are too insignificant from a moral standpoint to 
be compared instructively to talents. People’s career aspirations are inti-
mately related to their talents: one can only realistically entertain certain 
goals for oneself if one possesses the abilities needed to achieve them. Yet 
having a successful or happy career is..., at least for many people, a cru-
cial component of leading a decent life. These facts are unlikely to change 
under egalitarian conditions. Hence, those who were unable to find work 
when there was plenty of it about would be unable to realize important 
human aspirations (Hinton 2001: 76-77).
The earlier Wolff (1998: 115) paper also endorses a similar line. However, 
this line of objection fails. Notice that Hinton has switched the focus of the 
27. It is not necessary for all traces of any beliefs that contradict the ITP to be removed from 
citizens’ minds in order for shame at lack of talents to cease to be a problem. If one only rejects 
the ITP in a very minimal way, then I doubt we need to be too concerned about any shame occa-
sioned by this. (I assume the more marginal a belief is in one’s conscious or unconscious mind, 
the weaker any emotion that contains it).
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untalenteds’ distress28 from their untalentedness to their lack of a career. 
However, assuming a roughly similar market in both societies, people who 
are too untalented to get a job in a luck egalitarian society will also be too 
untalented to get a job in a society with unconditional welfare benefits. The 
fact that untalented people will not be able to fulfil the important human 
aspiration of getting a job is not a problem unique to luck egalitarianism: 
this fact does not, in itself, give us reason to prefer a system of unconditional 
state-benefits.
But, one might still have worries: even assuming that the general argu-
ment of my paper is correct and citizens would not be ashamed of the brute 
fact that they’re untalented, would a luck egalitarian society cause untal-
ented (and unemployed) citizens to feel any significant additional distress 
compared to a society with unconditional state-benefits? After all, in con-
trast to untalented citizens of a society with unconditional welfare benefits, 
untalented citizens of a luck egalitarian society are forced to know why they 
are unemployed. Both Wolff and Hinton claim, therefore, that a system of 
unconditional state benefits is better for the (involuntarily) unemployed be-
cause it allows them to believe that they are unemployed through choice 
(Hinton 2001: 77; Wolff’s 1998: 114). I’ll allow that the sense of distress at 
not having a job is lessened if one believes that one is unemployed through 
choice.29 But Wolff and Hintons’ claim can only plausibly apply to citizens 
who have applied for no, or very few, jobs: the idea that people who are fre-
quently applying for jobs and being rejected would believe that they were 
unemployed through choice is implausible. In a non-luck egalitarian society, 
citizens could blame their unemployment on factors other than their lack 
of talent (e. g. their prospective employers’ bad taste). But, this doesn’t show 
that they will be significantly less distressed than they would be in a luck-
egalitarian society. If one wants a job and can’t get one, then, since it is the 
job that one wants (and not the talents per se), one will be very disappointed 
whatever the reason for one’s lack of employment. 
Yet an objector might persist: luck egalitarianism forces citizens to give 
up hope of getting a job in a much blunter way than a society with uncondi-
tional welfare benefits. (I assume that one is more likely to maintain the hope 
of getting a job if one blames it on external factors, like prospective employ-
ers’ bad taste, rather than on one’s own untalentedness). However, this isn’t 
necessarily a black mark for luck egalitarianism. An untalented luck egalitar-
28. I’m using the word ‘distress’ to allow for a broad range of negative emotions, feelings or 
moods that might be felt due to being unemployed.
29. Although, if one is claiming state benefits and believes that one is unemployed through 
choice, this might involve believing that one is a ‘welfare-scrounger’, which is surely a poten-
tial source of shame for the untalented citizens and resentment and condemnation from other 
citizens.
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ian citizen could dwell, for the rest of her life, on the fact that she’s unlikely 
to get a job. Or she could cut her losses and move on: paid employment is 
not our only meaningful occupation (think of, for example, studying, family 
raising and making music).30 In a system of unconditional welfare benefits 
on the other hand, an untalented citizen is more likely to be unaware that 
she’s unlikely to get a job. Therefore, she may well apply for job after job and 
then face disappointment after disappointment as she is rejected each time. 
And, eventually, she will probably realise that she is unlikely to get a job any-
way. There are clearly reasons to prefer the former situation, so it is far from 
settled that unconditional state-benefits are better for the untalented in an 
ideal egalitarian society. 
6. WHAT ABOUT THE REAL WORLD?31
Because of the problems Wolff sees in luck egalitarianism, he suggests that 
egalitarians have at least one reason to campaign for unconditional welfare 
schemes in real world politics (Wolff 1998: 97).32 I fully accept Wolff’s warn-
ing: given that in our current society citizens would be ashamed of revealing 
their lack of talent, we should be careful about campaigning for a condition-
al state benefits system. Sometimes the best thing to do is to sacrifice a little 
fairness to maintain respect. But, when we do this, we must remember that 
fairness is sacrificed. We therefore have a reason to inquire as to whether we 
can find a better arrangement. 
In this paper, I have conceded that an ideal luck egalitarian society would 
be difficult to achieve. But something being difficult to achieve doesn’t, with-
out further reflection, mean we shouldn’t try to achieve it —especially when 
what is at stake is, like fairness, important. If what I argue in this paper is 
correct, a promising way to proceed would be to change peoples’ beliefs so 
that they accept and value themselves (and others) for what they are, rath-
er than just giving up on distributive fairness. We might be able to change 
peoples’ beliefs enough to make their shame shallow or we might be able to 
change some people’s beliefs completely. This proposal is not perfect, but, 
since we’re now talking about the real world, we already know that what we 
achieve won’t be perfect. The point I want to make, however, is that if we opt 
immediately for an unconditional state benefit system, we might miss an 
30. Wolff makes a similar point in the recent paper (2010: 345). He says that discreet meet-
ings with state officials that focus on helping a person come to terms with her untalentedness 
and building up the talents she has might actually serve to increase self-respect.
31. I would like to note that the arguments of this section are broadly in harmony with the 
material in Wolff’s new paper (2010: esp. 346-7).
32. Though explicitly denies that an unconditional system is necessarily and all-things-
considered better in the new paper.
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opportunity to minimise the conflict between fairness and respect and so 
miss an opportunity to make the world more just. 
Changing peoples’ attitudes towards talents might seem like a utopian 
dream (Wolff 1998: 115), but it’s not as far fetched as one might think. First, 
history tells us that it is possible to reduce the level of deep-seated societal 
prejudices (look at the progress we’ve made with regard to sexism, racism, 
and homophobia). Second, my evidence here is anecdotal but, one only 
needs to look at literature surrounding the disability rights movements to 
see that many of today’s disabled people are not ashamed of their disabilities 
or dependence and, despite their pain and frustration, see their lives as rich 
and meaningful.33 Consider this passage from Michael Wenham’s autobio-
graphical account of living with a motor neuron disorder:
As adults living in 21st-century Britain, we are invited to measure our 
value in economic terms. All of us get the message that we are valued 
for what we do, what we produce, what we contribute to society. Unem-
ployment is the ultimate negation of worth. In The Full Monty, the job-
less miners make a great discovery: that they have a dignity, they’re worth 
something, even when they are stripped bare. Being inexorably rendered 
incapable is like undergoing an enforced, prolonged and embarrassing 
striptease. I can contribute less and less. I cannot even help to lay the 
table for a meal. The astonishing effect, however, is this: as I do less and 
“just be” more, those nearest me, starting with my family, value me no 
less. Indeed, since my self-esteem used to depend in part on what I did, I 
feel that I am valued more (Wenham 2008, my emphasis).
Wenham is not alone. There are numerous disability rights activists out 
there campaigning for acceptance and respect, whose work is motivated by a 
deep conviction of the value of disabled persons.34 Of course, not all disabled 
people are as strong and determined as these campaigners and I do not wish 
to downplay the internal difficulties (frustration, depression etc.) they face. 
But my point is simply this: we are not in an ideal egalitarian society now and 
many disabled individuals clearly view themselves as having equal value to 
33. Many physically disabled people can and do work now. Indeed, many in the disability 
rights movement stress the abilities and employability of disabled people (consider the aptly 
named group ‘Able-disabled’). However, in general, physically disabled people need more re-
sources to facilitate this (for example, carers and specialist equipment). But the key point is 
that they’re not ashamed to campaign for these on the basis of the fact that they lack certain 
market-relevant talents. 
34. To name a couple more examples: Alison Lapper, the British artist with no arms and 
shortened legs who frequently poses naked for photographs and describes a sculpture of her-
self naked and pregnant as ‘beautiful’ (see www.alisonlapper.com). Baroness Jane Campbell of 
‘Not Dead Yet’ campaigns against euthanasia for only the terminally ill precisely because she 
believes that a life full of pain and dependence is a valuable life.
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able bodied people and are not ashamed of their disability. It is implausible 
and unduly pessimistic to assume that we cannot improve upon the levels 
of prejudice in our current society. It is, therefore, also unduly pessimistic to 
assume that we can’t increase the number of unashamed untalented people. 
We probably don’t need to achieve a totally ideal egalitarian society —that 
is, a society where every single member fully embraces the ITP— to signifi-
cantly increase the number of people who are not ashamed at their lack of 
talent. A society with a better balance of fairness and respect than a society 
with an unconditional benefits system is surely achievable. We should not 
give up on this goal. 
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